Genetic and Static Consciousness in Relation to Garlic and Husserl: A Spinozan Fairytale

Genetic Consciousness


Eidetic as related to phenomenological experience to produce analyses:   Eidetic equates to Difference experience, and phenomenon relates to the Identity delivered in the experience thereof.

In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl writes:

… (inquiry into) the “static” constitution of objects, which relates to an already “developed” subjectivity, has its counterpart in (an inquiry into) an a priori genetic constitution, (a subsequent inquiry,)” based on (the results of) the former, which necessarily precedes it.[1]


            Garlic recognizes “the ‘static’ constitution of (possible and probable) objects” to be Spinoza’s Infinite / Finite God:  The only a priori thereness grounding all possibilities and probabilities through time.  Although the static experience, as it is in its own right a historical genetic strand of consciousness in waiting to unfold in manifold Identity experience (as possibility and probability), it should be, by no means, described as, in the words of Dr. Mary Jeanne Larrabee from Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology[2],


A simple description of static analysis is that it analyzes a constituted object without dealing with the temporal process in which the object is constituted; it considers the object’s constitution as though it were halted at its termination. For this reason, static analysis is commonly characterized as lacking all reference to time.  Husserl notes this limitation placed on static analysis in Ideas I:  “Luckily we can put aside the enigmas of time-consciousness in our preliminary analyses, without endangering their rigour.”[3] (p. 164)


            The static experience, in that it precedes the genetic constitution, is always grounding the genetic-unfolding / infolding.  It is this actual geometic-unfolding / inffolding and the consequent awareness of the in waiting that is the grounding Husserl never regulates to a “termination” of the static, phenomenological or genetic experience itself.   The static is simply the only knowable experience:  Difference as it is of Finite / Infinite or the one and the many or the parts and whole relation.  The two, static and genetic, are simply enigmatically related in that Identity appears to be the beginning of the discourse, in as far as it is a knowable static experience, but, in the analysis, it is not necessarily knowable by any given 'one' or 'Finite' or 'part' in the corresponding relations to 'many', 'Infinite' or 'whole'.  This is a falsehood, a self-imposed problem, imagined by Descartes.   Even throughout the rise of quantum theory and eventually quantum-like values applied in Evolutionary Theory, such as the term memetics[4], there has never yet been a corresponding analyzation of this enigmatic relationship as it is ever present in the act of theorizing and the subsequent theories derived therefrom.  And consequently these sciences and their theories are unwittingly acquiring relgious attributes in their descriptions. In the enigmatically related discourse without a 'Finite' or 'many' or 'part' as the necessarily given or knowable, the static analysis remains eidetic phenomenology, but the Epoché has to be reevaluated:  It is mereological in nature—the Infinite / Finite or the one and the many dialogue or the parts and whole relations—and the discourse itself, as it is no longer a product of a self, must be left to an unknown value:  See Garlic.   Such primal discourse is, because it is not phenomenological in any way, shape or form, of mathematical and geometrical nature.  The combination of which, the mathematical and geometrical, results in a historical genetic strand of consciousness in waiting to unfold in manifold Identity experience, as mathematical and geometrical consciousness, (finite/infinite possibility and probability).  Because we believe, when clinging to the Husserlian limitations as defined in the Cartesian idea of self, the phenomena to be “there”, the mathematical and geometrical values are thus believed to be objects of one’s consciousness.  However, they are not objects but they are consciousness consciousizing:  They are, in the realm of Garlic, no longer in waiting but the becoming of probability and possibility of the Infinite / Finite or the one and the many or the part and whole.  Yes, one is there, wherever there may be in the static experience, but only in a probable and possible state.  This simply means one is becoming or alive.   However, any thing, if the static experience is to precede the genetic-unfolding / infolding, is, hence, an illusion generated in such a way as to make the genetic-unfolding / infolding appear independent of the actual act of grounding or from its ground. Dr. Larrabee argues that this, the flow of discourse from static to genetic, is “justified mainly on practical grounds.  It simplifies the projected anaylsis by omitting certain issues.  The discussion of constitution is thereby ‘abbreviated’ so that only one of its basic aspects (the correlation between act and object) is allowed to play a part in the analysis.” (p. 165)  But for Husserl as it is for Garlic, the First Act has no object other than to ground itself in its original essence of Infinite / Finite or one and many or parts and whole.  (Unmoved Mover or First Act and thaumázein are discussed in great detail in the Origins of Garlic Cures.)  This falls in line with Garlic’s recognition of the “static” constitution of (possible and probable) objects to be Spinoza’s Infinite / Finite God:  The only apriori thereness grounding all possibilities and probabilities through time.  As Denis Fissete, in Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology, points out;



We refer specifically to a draft of a letter that Husserl addressed to Stumpf in 1919 (Husserl 1996, 174 ff), which is unexpectedly relevant to our study since it sheds new light on an enigmatic remark in Erkenntnislehre on the parallelism between noema and noesis in Ideas I. The letter is a long commentary on two studies by Stumpf on the parallelism between the attributes of thought and extension in Spinoza’s Ethics (Stumpf 1919b). Stumpf claims in his studies that Spinoza’s parallelism has nothing to do with the psychophysical parallelism that dominated since Fechner; it is to be understood, rather, “as the parallelism between the immanent objects of the acts directed toward them, as it was taught since Aristotle” (1919b, 19) and which, via the Scholastic, made its way up to Brentano and perhaps Husserl. Stumpf argues that these two attributes are immediately given to consciousness, and the discipline that studies the law of that parallelism is nothing other than descriptive psychology. It is in this context that he refers to Husserl, saying that rather than descriptive psychology, Husserl would be comfortable with the term phenomenology, “because it [Parallelitätsgesetz] is grounded a priori through a vision of essence” (1917b, 34 f). Yet, according to the remark in Erkenntnislehre, the noesis-noema parallelism behaves exactly like Spinoza’s parallelism between the attributes of thought and extension under the principle that “una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa.” (Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology, Man and World, June 1976, Volume 9, Issue 2, p. 188)


This distinction in the enigmatic relation between static and genetic analysis is vital to understanding, as it is a process, what conflicted Husserl in his interpretation of the intentional acts and the arising phenomenon itself, and it also means that the “static” consciousness, in that it is reflective of Spinoza’s una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa, is always grounded in the static awareness.  Although the genetic constitution, as it is the constitution, allows for an “I” to be aware and to understand, it is not the nature or origin of the act (of thinking):  Time is the act of extending (extension).  The Epoché can either suspend the experience or deliver it, and, perhaps, for Husserl there was a suspension of the Identity or phenomenon (in the way in which he tried to maintain a Cartesian notion of self) in order to achieve a static state of meditation or a method free from the relative influence of Identity in the discourse itself, but he intuitively knew that the experience of Difference into Identity and back into Difference, as it (they) is (are) an inseparable context, was and is dependent on one another as they are given in the context of the’s why intentionality remains somewhat vague in his analysis. “It follows from this principle, Stumpf adds, that in the same way that for Spinoza the laws of nature are also laws of thought, for Husserl the laws in the noetic domain, that is descriptive psychology, should also be the laws of the noematic and consequently of pure phenomenology.”[5]  What perplexed and perplexes readers (of Husserl) to follow was and is the nature of the “Difference” which necessarily precedes the “Identity”:  One is always talking through and as an Identity perspective. Im an Identity perspective there is a break between Existence and Life whereby existence is recognized in its unity, as an Identity perspective, but life becomes the sacrifice needed to sustain the awareness of that which remains consequently (in the sacrifice) missing, and, thus, this is why Phenomenology seems to fail in its analysis of the experience.   “The phenomenologists who followed him (Husserl) are characterized by a remarkable hunger for world.  Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre fill out Husserl’s transcendental structure with Dasein, bodiliness, society.  Husserl’s conception of Lebenswelt, emergent in his later works, unintentionally gave this development yet another name pregnant with meaning.  The world in and around us returns powerful in the determination of man’s being.  The ontological element which Husserl’s phenomenological reduction excludes becomes anew the determining element.”[6]    Garlic, however, recognizes and embraces the 'mereological' nature, as it is a genetic unfolding / infolding of the Infinite / Finite, of this Spinozan or Difference ground upon which the Identity (phenomenon) rises.[7] 


Dr. Mary Jeanne Larrabee further writes,

" Given Husserl’s statements about static phenomenology, we can formulate two principles of static method:

'Guide the analysis by the use of a 'transcendental clue' in the form of an object which is pregiven and therefor is a finished unity embodying a certain sense (Sinn),[8]' and (2) Carry out a series of correlation analyses which trace on the side of the object its various levels and on the side of consciousness the corresponding levels of conscious acts.[9]  Besides these basic principles, we can formulate an ordering principle based on an eidetic but non-phenomenological analysis of the basic structures of consciousness, leaving aside the issues dealing with inner time-consciousness as prescribed in the above limitation.' " (Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology, Man and World, June 1976, Volume 9, Issue 2, p. 164)


What “the form of an object which is pregiven and therefore is a finished unity embodying a certain sense (Sinn)” refers to is a unique yet universal machine of discovery:  The Individual or self as a conscious thing.  This is a fair critique of Husserl’s constraints in his investigation, but it also reveals the self-imposed limitation Husserl and his phenomenology brought with it into the investigation.  As consequence of the self-imposed control, aka the self, the aim of Garlic is to reveal how and why science, especially quantum physics and Evolutionary Theory (in particular Dr. Dawkins) have run amok and why the value and importance of philosophy is, rightfully so, falling to the wayside.



[1] Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns, (The Hague 1969) p. 221

[2]Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology,  Man and World, June 1976, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 163-174

[3] Ideen I, p. 198. In fact, not quite all references to inner time-consciousness are omitted from static analysis.  The concept of inner time in an abstracted sense is allowed within the discussion of certain synthetic acts.  See Ideen I, p. 292 (Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.  Erstes Buch : Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (1913), ed. W. Biemel (The Hague, 1950), p. 315.

[4] The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins 1976

[5] Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology, Denis Fisette, p. 188 (

[6] Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology: Man and Nature, II. Ontological and Methodological Monism: Husserl versus Spinoza, Wolfgang Schirmacher p. 347, Springer 1983

[7] This process is also reflected in how modern quantum mechanics and physics are explored theoretically and, to some degree, in praxis.  See wave/particle states, complementarity and such.

[8] Logic, p. 227

[9] Ideen, p. 247-48