Husserl’s Intentionality versus the undeclared Intentionality in the Garlic Cures: Thaumázein or Knowledge

I say undeclared because Garlic never defines the “what” and/or “how” in the “happening”, in as far as “happening” is simply “consciousness acting” or “consciousizing”, in terms of “intentionality” --- but it is what it is. Perhaps the reason for not declaring "consciousizing" to be a form of "intentionality" is because Garlic remains truer, in form and spirit, to what Franz Brentano refers to as Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung (literally 'truth-grasping is false-grasping' or ‘perception is misception'), and, therefore, the "perceived-perceiver" relationship is fundamentally different in the Garlic Cures. Thus what Husserl calls "phenomenon" is not the same as what Garlic reveals, through pure or unadulterated "consciousizing", as Difference/Identity thereness. Garlic, like Brentano, believes perception is erroneous: “External, sensory perception does not tell us anything about the de facto existence of the perceived world; a “world” which is always only an illusion”(A)…even when it comes to the perception of the perception. So when Husserl writes: “Mit der Frage nach dem transzendentalen System der Intentionalität, durch das ego eine Natur, eine Welt beständig da ist – zunächst in Erfahrung als direkt sichtbare, greifbare usw. und dann durch jederlei sonst auf Welt gerichtete Intentionalität – mit dieser Frage stehen wir eigentlich schon in der Phänomenologie der Vernunft. Vernunft und Unvernunft, im weitesten Sinn verstanden, bezeichnen keine zufällig-faktischen Vermögen und Tatsachen, sondern gehören zur allgemeinsten Strukturform der transzendentalen Subjektivität überhaupt,(1)“ he is reasserting a Cartesian principle of certainty which arises from doubt of the „doubter“… The „truth of the matter“ is: A „doubter“, as an object of “erroneous, external, sensory perception”, is only undefinable illusion. Therefore, from the perspective of Garlic, to say “there is an illusion” can only be confirmed, in the sense of “knowing”, through a relationship of object-to-object Differentiating. "What gives an illusion any justifiable sense of certainty when the only certainty is always only given as an illusion" should, therefore, be the only aim of the Phenomenological investigation. In other words, the “what” of the illusion, as it can only be an illusion, defines the search to be limited to the boundless search for “how” an “illusion of what” rises. (In other other words, “the search”, in as far as any scientific principles can be applied, is paradoxically always, in the first initiating act of searching, a religious endeavor.)

Garlic goes even further by pointing out that the sciences of Quantum Physics, Evolutionary Theory and Genetics, although having circumvented this same conclusion (that physical, finite reality is mere illusion) by applying values in their theories that have their presentation in finite/infinite "‘whimsical cages’(2) of irrelevant system structures", also reveal only illusions – because although probability and possibility only leave open discrepancies given to one’s perceptions that are almost indiscernible (see Heisenberg Principle), these indiscernible discrepancies are enough to allow for the creation of either “alternate universes” or are enough allowance to create and destroy our own universe, for example, an infinite number of times. So to say that the discrepancies between the perceiver and the perceived are almost indiscernible is “hogwash”. And to believe that applying "'whimsical cages' of irrelevant system structures" is enough to allow for some kind of “understanding” of the “real world” is to be very misleading. The marvel (thaumázein) in the theories is not found in the theories themselves, but it is of the act of theorizing…these sciences, although being engaged in consciousness in the most admirable sense of “being conscious”, have the false God of “self” leading them in all the wrong directions.

As for the difference between Husserl’s intentionality and that of Garlic (and how it relates to the previous paragraph), Husserl begins with the Cartesian premise that an “identity”, namely the “self”, offers a certain clarity and certainty to the philosopher because the philosopher sees function (of the “philosophical” mind) as a natural aspect defining the “defining acts themselves”: “Philosophie ist eine ganz persönliche Angelegenheit des Philosophierenden. Es handelt sich um seine sapientis universalis, das ist um sein ins Universale fortstrebendes Wissen – aber um ein echt wissenschaftliches, das er von Anfang an und in jedem Schritte absolut verantworten kann aus seinen absolut einsichtigen Gründen.”(3) It is especially important here to differentiate here between Husserl’s „function“ as it underscored by „Universale fortstrebendes Wissen“ or „universal in-pursuit of knowledge” consciousness, and consciousness that only has thaumazein as its origin and end: There is no telos for Garlic, but only awe (thaumázein). Function, not to be confused with order, in the Husserlean sense, is an attribute of an Identity that no longer has a recognizable relation to Difference. And in regards to “knowledge” in as far as it relates to awe or thaumázein and, thus, Garlic, the only knowledge ever given in any discourse is in the relations of Difference. The Identity, as in Husserl’s Cartesian “self”, is not a knowable item (for further inspection thru introspection). In this sense, too, Garlic remains truer to Brentano’s “presentation” when engaging phenomenon as it can only be an existential act. Existence is Difference relations. “Intentionality” (through the eyes of Garlic), as I deliver it in an unpublished paper from 2008, is a manifold of positivity: A whole composed of diverse elements....elements that, in their existential essences, are Infinite/Finitude.

(A) The sentence is paraphrased from different sources in the Internet.
(1) Zweite Doppelvorlesung am 25. Februar 1929, 1. Teil, Seite 2
(2) “whimsical cages” simply means a symbolic representation: “X” or “memetic” or “complementarity” or “whimsical cages”….
(3) Erste Doppelvorlesung am 23. Februar 1929, 1. Teil, Seite 3